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Abstract—Supply chain is emerging as the next frontier of threats in
the rapidly evolving IoT ecosystem. It is fundamentally more complex
compared to traditional ICT systems. We analyze supply chain risks in
IoT systems and their unique aspects, discuss research challenges in
supply chain security, and identify future research directions.
1 INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is being used as a key enabling
technology to secure the supply chain of several industries by
tracking of assets, raw materials, and supplies. However, the
supply chain security of the IoT itself is generally overlooked.
The IoT is an interconnection of smart devices and components
that come together to provide situational awareness and automated
operation of electronic systems. It is not a standalone system
obtained from a single supplier or manufacturer, having propriety
hardware and software. Instead, it is composed of various different
interconnected components that may be designed, manufactured,
and operated by different entities located in different parts of the
world.
A generic illustration of the various components along the
IoT technology stack and their interconnection is provided in
Figure 1. In essence, there are several actors involved in set-
ting up the IoT ecosystem that include sensing/actuating device
manufacturers, firmware developers, radio access network service
providers, cloud service providers, mobile app developers, and end
users. The endpoint devices are made of embedded hardware that
interact with the physical environment and are driven by software
processes referred to as firmware or operating system. These make
use of communication infrastructure, which is composed of access
points, gateways, and core IP networks to connect to cloud servers,
that in turn host applications and services, which are operated by
users via computing devices such as smart phones, smart watches
and voice assistants, etc. More and more systems are becoming
intelligent and autonomous with the emergence of IoT devices and
enhanced ICT infrastructure. However, the integration of multiple
devices and components that are designed and manufactured by
different entities makes the system extremely vulnerable to cyber-
physical attacks.
The IoT ecosystem faces serious security threats from tradi-
tional attackers due to factors such as low cost, inherent inter-
operability, and rapid product development life cycle. Recent large
scale cyber attacks such as Mirai [1] botnet and Stuxnet [2] have
exploited some of the vulnerabilities in IoT systems. Apart from
other traditional cyber and physical threats to the IoT ecosystem,
Fig. 1. IoT Technology Stack.
the supply chain is emerging as a new source of potential threats.
It emanates from the fact that the IoT systems are often deployed
in a decentralized manner where managers acquire and deploy
equipment needed for improving the efficiency of their business
lines. It is generally done without investigating who the suppliers
actually are and what risks the suppliers bring to the overall
system. Small enterprises, in general, do not have the necessary
resources to manage or even assess their risks by increasing
automation via the IoT [3]. Therefore, besides tackling traditional
cyber-physical threats to the IoT, steps need to be taken to ward
off threats at the supply chain front as well. This article provides
an analysis of some of these threats, research challenges, and
potential future directions. We restrict our focus on the supply
chain dimension of attacks and risks in the IoT arena.
2 IOT SUPPLY CHAIN RISK LANDSCAPE: HARD
TO OBSERVE AND HARD TO CONTROL
Supply chain risk has long been a matter of great concern for
businesses and corporations. In fact, supply chain risk manage-
ment (SCRM) is a standard functional area across many industries
ar
X
iv
:1
90
8.
07
82
8v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
1 J
ul 
20
19
such as consumer goods, food, industrial products, etc., and is
considered to be a vital component in securing the revenues and
profitability of enterprises. Security of information and communi-
cations technology (ICT) equipment has been an area of immense
focus in recent times. since more advanced and sophisticated
methods have emerged to attack IT/OT systems. Cyber-physical
attacks on these systems may result in significant monetary and
non-monetary losses. To counter threats from such attacks, the
U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has
prepared a comprehensive list of best practices for SCRM in
traditional ICT systems [4].
The development and growth of the IoT is further enhancing
the security concerns. Although the flexibility of communication
and interaction between devices results in tremendous benefits,
however it also opens doors for attackers and malicious actors to
sabotage the system. With the emergence of vendor based attacks
and the involvement of global players, there are rising concern
on the security of the IoT supply chain. The IoT is a special
class of ICT systems and is evolving rapidly. The interconnection
of systems and devices enables a much richer attack surface as
opposed to traditional ICT systems. Moreover, the supply chain
of the IoT is extremely complex, globally distributed, and highly
inter-connected. In addition, the IoT is still a grossly unregulated
technology in terms of security standards unlike food, where the
risks are better understood. It is mainly because the ecosystem
is highly diverse and the consequences of attacks are relatively
unknown. In certain industries such as food and medicine, there
are agencies that regulate the safety standards. It’s because the risk
assessment has been done by testing the products repeatedly on
subjects and evaluating the results. However, in the IoT ecosystem,
there are limitless functionalities as well as possibilities of mal-
function and malicious activity. Hence, determining the possible
attacks and enumerating the consequences becomes extremely
challenging.
In summary, the risk landscape of the IoT supply chain is
extremely diverse. The suppliers may ember backdoor channels un
devices, inject viruses, provide faulty chips, or load with malicious
software. These are some of the possibilities that the IoT systems
can be attacked. The alarming concern is that these IoT systems
are set to control national critical infrastructure resources as well
as improving battlefield effectiveness. The supply chain risks are
hard to observe and hard to control. The risk propagates from
one device to the other and gets amplified as the IoT ecosystem
becomes more complex. It is not straightforward to determine
where to regulate the entire system.
3 DISSECTING SUPPLY CHAIN LINKS IN IOT
There is a delicate interplay between suppliers and devices in an
IoT ecosystem. To illustrate the different type of interactions that
may be present between suppliers and devices, we provide an
example in Fig. 2 where there are two devices obtained from two
different suppliers. While the supply chain can be constructed
several levels deep due to individual components in devices
being manufactured by different entities, however, for the sake
of simplicity, the immediate supplier of standalone devices is
considered. In such a scenario, the following different interactions
between the supply chain actors might be present.
• Device-Supplier Interactions: This is a typical buyer
supplier interaction. The devices are procured from the
Fig. 2. Key interactions between different players in the supply chain
ecosystem of the IoT.
suppliers and have service contracts including mainte-
nance, upgrades, security patches, etc. The devices have
security and support requirements that need to be met
under the agreements.
• Supplier-Supplier Interactions: Suppliers may have dif-
ferent front-end companies but common connections at
the back end. This is typically common in the tech world
where corporations have mergers and takeovers. Different
suppliers may be owned by a common entity having more
control over the supply chain of the IoT network. A nexus
of supply chain actors may result in the possibility of
coordinated attacks using backdoor channels and other
forms of advanced persistent threats.
• Device-Device Interactions: These interactions are
present due to the inter-connectivity of the IoT devices
to provide desired functionality. These interactions are
significant since they allow supply chain risks from one
device to transfer to the other independently of its own
supply chain.
A more detailed illustration of the supply chain interaction
with the physical IoT network is provided in Fig. 3. There is
a component graph that defines the underlying connectivity of
devices that make up the IoT ecosystem. Each component has its
independent supply chain. However, the supply chains of devices
may be linked not only via external affiliations but also via
physical connectivity of devices in the IoT network. It implies
that the risk reciprocates among devices in the network. In other
words, my risk becomes your risk and your risk becomes my
risk. This makes the analysis of supply chain risks in IoT systems
extremely convoluted.
4 IOT RISK IMPLICATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES
The impact of risk in IoT is critically important to analyze since it
deals with the physical world and any attack or malicious activity
may result in significant consequences such as physical damages,
operational disruption, danger to human safety, etc. For instance, a
malfunctioning of heating or cooling systems may result is sudden
power surges resulting in breakdowns. It may cause a significant
loss of revenue as well as damage to the power system. Therefore,
there are implications and consequences of the risk that can be
categorized as follows:
• Monetary Implications: The risk inevitably translates to
monetary impact since any disruption or damage to in-
frastructure would lead to loss of revenue and/or safety
Fig. 3. Mapping of IoT and the underlying supply chain networks.
hazards. Therefore, the financial impact is important to
take into account while selecting the supply chain of IoT
network.
• Legal Implications: In the occurrence of a large scale
cyber incident, the liability and responsibility needs to be
determined. It is important to determine to what extent are
the supply chain actors liable for security breaches and
what actions can be taken against them. Therefore, there
is a need to clearly map out the liability network.
• Policy Implications: Risk determines a lot of policies
that must be followed by the IoT ecosystem. Patching
and upgrade policies are determined by how risky the
system is. Cyber-insurance policies and premiums will
also depend on how much risk is present in the system.
While supply chain is only a part of the total risk, however,
it plays a crucial role is determining the cyber risk of
the overall system since the same functionalities may be
offered by less trustworthy suppliers.
It is important for stakeholders in the supply chain to be aware
of the implications so they can decide whether they want to be
part of a supply chain that may render them legally or financially
liable.
5 UNIQUE ASPECTS OF IOT SECURITY
The IoT itself and its security is drastically different than tradi-
tional ICT systems. Firstly, there are many different players par-
ticipating in an unregulated system. Then, the devices are highly
inter-operable allowing for limitless possibilities for applications.
In fact, it is up to the individual users to build their own desired
functionalities and enforce policies on the system. Unlike the
Internet, there is no standard protocol stack for the IoT ecosystem.
This makes it difficult to embed security into the protocols. The
inherent inter-operability in the IoT creates security challenges
and vulnerabilities. To this end, the role of the supply chain in
IoT is also completely different. While existing wisdom in SCRM
for ICT does act as a useful guideline, it may not be sufficient to
tackle the more complex nature of IoT networks and the associated
supply chain [5]. A summary of the key differences in IoT systems
and their security as compared to conventional ICT systems is
provided below:
• Interaction with the physical world: The IoT devices
interact with the physical world with the aid of actua-
tion capabilities as opposed to conventional mobile and
computing systems. It results in completely different con-
sequences compared to ICT systems since it may endanger
human safety, damage equipment, or cause operational
disruptions.
• Limited access control and management: The IoT devices
are often low powered with limited computational capabil-
ities. The complete access and management functionalities
may not be built into these devices.
• Different cyber-security standards: The security and pri-
vacy requirements for IoT device operation may be com-
pletely different from conventional ICT systems due to
different authentication and access mechanisms.
• Heterogeneous ownership and de-centralized control:
There is no network administrator that has control over the
IoT device configurations. Unlike routers and IP networks,
the network administrator may not even have a complete
view of all the connected devices in the network.
6 RESEARCH CHALLENGES
Since, the IoT is inherently a de-centralized system, it is difficult
to exert control over the entire supply chain. However, the chal-
lenges go much beyond the regulation of the supply chain [6].
It is important to study and analyze the threat ecosystem in the
IoT landscape. It implies that the potential sources of attack be
identified and their potential implications studied in terms of the
functionality and/or damage caused to the overall system. In this
aspect, some challenges are related to technical aspects of IoT,
while others emanate from the logistics and analysis or decision-
making standpoint [7]. Some of the key logistical challenges are
as follows:
• Lack of control over upstream supply chain: There is no
control over upstream supply chain from a device owners
point of view. In other words, the buyers do not have com-
plete information about the cyber-physical supply chain of
the products.
• Disclosure of supply chain information: Not all suppliers
are ready to clearly articulate their cyber security practices
and disclose their supply chain information. Some of it is
obvious due to privacy reasons and competitor-sensitive
information.
• Awareness of vulnerabilities: The suppliers of IoT equip-
ment may not be fully aware of all the possible vulnerabil-
ities in their products. This makes it harder to determine
the possible attack paths and analyze risk.
• Centralized database of vulnerabilities: There is no cen-
tralized database of known vulnerabilities and attacks that
can serve as a guideline to identify risks and possible
attacks.
• Heterogeneous supply chain management practices: The
management practices for supply chain to mitigate associ-
ated security risks are diverse and depend on the industry.
heterogeneity across application sectors.
Apart from the logistical constraints, there are also technical
challenges in managing security of the IoT devices can be ex-
pressed as follows:
• Lack of management controls: centralized network man-
agement may not be available for the IoT. There is a need
for developing management platforms to provide more
control to the administrator over the IoT infrastructure.
• Inflexible hardware: IoT device hardware may not be
serviceable, meaning it cannot be repaired, customized,
or inspected internally
• Heterogeneous ownership: The devices are owned and
operated by separate entities resulting in less control over
policy implementation.
Finally, some of the decision-making and policy questions that
need to be addressed are as follows:
• Risk informed procurement and deployment: The decisions
to procure and deploy IoT network devices needs to be
done in a risk-informed manner to allow for cost-benefit
analysis.
• Contingency planning: The IoT network requires arrange-
ment of contingencies since suppliers may end security
updates or discontinue support for the equipment.
• Risk-Conscious supplier contracts: Contracts for installa-
tion services should include risk as as essential factor to
enable a more secure infrastructure.
Tackling these challenges by finding out novel ways to counter
them is important for the research community and policy makers.
These are some of the opportunities for researchers and technol-
ogists to come up with ways to counter these different types of
challenges that will pave the way for securing the IoT ecosystem
from supply chain threats.
7 THE WAY FORWARD
In a complex system of systems setting with many supply chain
actors and their convoluted interactions, it is an extremely chal-
lenging problem to mitigate and control supply chain oriented
risks. Moving forward, the way to tackle the problem is to first
fully understand the ecosystem from a supply chain viewpoint and
then take appropriate measures to control the risks. In light of
the highlighted challenges, there are two possible approaches that
can be followed to tackle the problem. The first is the top-down
approach, which is more centralized, while the second one is the
bottom-up approach, which takes a de-centralized viewpoint.
7.1 Top-Down approach to managing risk
Governments and policy makers are unable to micro manage and
control individual users of technology to adopt certain practices
particularly in the technology supply chain front. A top-down
approach uses a regulatory view of controlling supply risks in
the IoT ecosystem. At the outset, policies and restrictions can
be imposed on certain supply chain actors. For instance, certain
suppliers of equipment may be banned for use in an industry due
to detected malicious practices or excessive testing and standards
may be enforced on certain suppliers based on their trust and
reliability levels. Furthermore, they can be mandated to have com-
pulsory disclosure of vulnerabilities to form a centralized database
of threats. These will eventually lead to imposition of tariffs and
security requirements on the suppliers. Once the policies are in
place, the hope is that the managers and users of IoT technology
will be aware of the risks they import by procurement from certain
suppliers. This will ultimately result in risk-aware decisions by the
users of technology based on other considerations such as cost and
functionality. In essence, using a top-down approach, policy drives
the underlying technology and supply chain actions. The hope is
that centralized awareness and decision making may have a trickle
down effect to secure the IoT ecosystem from the supply chain
threats. Eventually, it might lead to a the development of secure
supply chain architectures for IoT [8] ecosystems. An illustration
of the main stages in the top-down approach is provided in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. Top-down approach for managing supply chain risks.
7.2 Bottom-Up approach to managing risk
The bottom up approach uses a totally different view from the
top-down approach. It aims to map out the view first and then
lead to the development of policies to control the risks. The first
step is to study and analyze the threat landscape, i.e., sources
of attack and potential impacts in terms of functionality and
anticipated loss/damage caused. This enables the formation of a
comprehensive view of threats and vulnerabilities that are both
adversarial and non-adversarial. Once the view has been mapped
out, there needs to be a more holistic and integrated measurement
of risk. Compound metrics for analyzing the risk as well as the
impact are needed. The risk is generally measured as the impact
times the likelihood. While the likelihood can be determined using
attack trees, the impact needs to be studied more carefully by
examining the inter-dependencies and information flows. Then,
the goal is to develop mitigation strategies. New infrastructure can
then be developed such as a centralized management platform that
is in control of the administrators to have a network wide view
of the IoT ecosystem and the supply chain actors involved. While
platforms may not be required for individual home users of IoT
devices, however, enterprises may need to have a comprehensive
tool that allows them to have a clear map of their deployments
and the associated risks and propagation. Once this is done, then
policies and best practices can be developed for wider dissem-
ination and enforcement. An example of such policy guidelines
is the strategic principles that have been proposed by the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security for securing the IoT [9].
Consequently, road maps for implementation can be developed
by individual industries according to their requirements [10]. The
bottom up approach can be summarized in the flow shown in
Fig. 5. In essence, the technology and risk assessment drives the
development of policy and regulations.
Fig. 5. Bottom-up approach for managing supply chain risks.
8 CONCLUSION
The supply chain risk management in IoT is a highly convoluted
problem to solve. Going forward, we envision that advances will
be made at several different fronts. The first direction is the
accurate mapping of the threat landscape in terms of the supply
chain. Then, a comprehensive risk assessment and impact analysis
needs to be done. Finally, mitigation strategies are needed to act
as a guideline for establishing best practices. Effective solutions
to ensure the supply chain security of the IoT requires a long
trajectory of development. There is a need for active public-private
engagement to come up with concrete solutions. Joint policy and
technical solutions are needed to counter the risks. Technology
should inform policy and policy should regulate technology. Con-
tinuous assessment of risks presented by existing suppliers and
response strategies is required for an effective defense against the
emerging supply chain threats in IoT systems.
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